On 27 June 2025, the European Commission confirmed that the Energy Release 2.0 mechanism, introduced by Decree No. 268 of 23 July 2024 of the Ministry for the Environment and Energy Security ('MASE') ('Energy Release 2.0 Decree')[1] , with the new structure illustrated by the Commission, can be considered compatible with the requirements relating to the promotion of renewable energy production under current state aid rules ("Comfort Letter").
This structure was incorporated into Decree No. 204 of 29 July 2025, published on the MASE website on 28 October ("Corrective Decree"), following registration by the Court of Auditors.
Finally, the MASE Directorial Decree published on 19 November 2025 approved the expected operating rules and contract templates prepared and submitted by the GSE ("Operating Rules").
These sources confirm that energy-intensive end customers - registered on the CSEA list as of 18 January 2025 - will be able to receive, for a period of thirty-six months ("Advance Period") starting from 1 January 2025, volumes of energy from Gestore dei Servizi Energetici S.p.A. (“GSE”) for a period of thirty-six months starting on 1 January 2025, through a two-way contract for difference with a reference price of €65/MWh based on monthly quotas of the total volume awarded to energy-intensive customers at the end of the allocation procedure, but introducing some significant provisions.
These include the Competitive Procedure, as defined below, for the allocation of volumes to be returned to the GSE and the regulation of the so-called Claw Back: the GSE's right to have the residual advantage corresponding to the lower of the present value of cash flows during the advance period and the difference, if positive, between the present value of cash flows during the advance period and the present value of cash flows during the return period, returned by the counterparty.
The repayment period still lasts twenty years, but this is supplemented by a further period of up to 20 years during which the aforementioned repayment may take place.
The Contract and the related Addendum governing the advance period and the repayment period
The energy consumer (or aggregator) is required to sign a contract (corresponding to the previous Advance Contract) aimed at regulating its relationship with the GSE by the deadline of 31 January 2026 ("Contract").
This contract covers:
i. the regulation of the differential for the advance payment to the operator of electricity volumes and the related guarantees of origin;
ii. the obligation to build new generation capacity from renewable sources within forty months of signing the single contract;
iii. the obligation to return the advance electricity and related Guarantees of Origin;
iv. the obligation to return the residual benefit.
Except as provided for in certain cases of award following the Competitive Procedure, the new generation capacity must be operational no earlier than 30 April 2025 and in any case no later than forty months after the date of signing the Contract, without prejudice to any extension due to force majeure or in cases of delay in the conclusion of administrative procedures. In any case, the final deadline already set for 31 December 2030 remains unchanged.
The contractual obligations relating to the entry into operation of the new capacity and the return obligations may be transferred by the energy consumer (or aggregator), with the relative release, to the delegated third party by signing the so-called Addendum, even after the Competitive Procedure has been carried out and in any case within forty months of the signing of the Contract.
With regard to the adjustment of the differential during the return period, it should be noted that for each month of the return period, the GSE calculates the difference between the Transfer Price and the higher than zero Day-Ahead Market price, determined in the relevant transaction period and in the market area where the plant is located, in relation to the monthly energy to be returned. A floor of zero has been included for the calculation of the differential. In the event of negative prices, the producer will receive the transfer price from the GSE and therefore the previous provision stating that 'the adjustment is suspended in the relevant periods when zero or negative prices are recorded on the MGP' no longer applies.
Advance settlement of accounts relating to the advance period
With regard to the payment of amounts relating to 2025, the GSE will make a single payment after the first invoice has been issued.
Guarantees of Origin cancelled by 31 March of year 'n' may be used to certify consumption for year 'n-1', but Guarantees of Origin recognised under the Contract that are cancelled by 30 April 2026 may be used to certify consumption for the year 2025.
The first guarantee relating to 2025 and 2026 must be provided by the energy-intensive consumer (or aggregator) for an amount calculated by the GSE on the basis of the amounts advanced with reference to the year 2025 and the estimate for 2026, and submitted by 28 February of the same year.
Competitive Procedure
Within ninety days of the date of publication of the new Operating Rules and following the signing of the Contract by energy-intensive end customers or aggregators, the GSE will publish the notice for the competitive procedure referred to in Article 6-bis of the Energy Release 2.0 Decree, as amended by the Corrective Decree, in order to select the third parties who will assume the obligation to build new generation capacity from renewable sources that will enable the already known requirement of producing at least double the volumes advanced to energy-intensive end customers during the advance period to be met ("Competitive Procedure").
The GSE will launch the Competitive Procedure no less than fifteen days after the date of publication of the notice. The procedure will remain open for the following thirty days and the outcome will be published within forty-five days of its closure.
The following entities may participate: (i) energy-intensive customers (or aggregators) who have signed the Contract (within the limits of the energy quota subject to advance payment); (ii) delegated third parties (within the limits of the energy quota covered by the Contract for which they have been delegated); (iii) third-party producers, energy-intensive customers (or aggregators) and delegates for an energy quota in addition to that covered by the Contract, who, in order to participate, meet the following requirements: a) availability of the licence to build and operate the plant and concessionaires; b) availability of a definitively accepted estimate for connection to the electricity grid and registration of the plant on Terna's GAUDI system validated by the grid operator; c) compliance of the plant with the performance requirements and environmental protection standards necessary to comply with the 'Do No Significant Harm' (DNSH) principle.
Participants will submit bids for the premium they are willing to receive or pay for the creation of the new generation capacity required for access to the mechanism, it being understood that participants may therefore also offer negative premiums. It is also envisaged that energy-intensive users (or aggregators) and delegates, with reference to the volumes covered by the advance contract signed, may, while participating, avoid submitting a bid. In this case, for the purposes of ranking, the GSE will also consider these volumes, assuming that, with reference to them, a bid equal to the minimum bid allowed has been submitted.
Participation, in turn, may be treated in two different ways depending on the participant and the volume for which they submit a bid.
The so-called 'Cluster A' will include requests for participation submitted without making an offer by (i) energy-intensive users, for all or only a portion of the energy covered by the Contract; (ii) energy-intensive customers in aggregate form, for all or only a portion of the energy covered by the contract; (iii) delegates, for all or only a portion of the energy covered by the Contract.
The so-called "Cluster B" will include requests for participation submitted with the intention of making an offer by: (i) energy-intensive customers, for all or only a portion of the energy covered by the Contract; (ii) energy-intensive customers, for the portion of energy exceeding the Contract; (iii) aggregators, for all or only a portion of the energy covered by the Contract; (iv) aggregators, for the portion of energy exceeding the Contract; (v) delegates for only the portion of energy exceeding the Contract, (vi) third-party producers without any quota limit.
Ranking and conclusion of the Award Contract
The ranking list shall be published within forty-five days of the closing date of the Competitive Procedure. The following shall be awarded: (i) all requests for participation in Cluster A; (ii) all bids in Cluster B that are lower than or equal to the value of the last accepted bid.
After the publication of the ranking, only the successful third-party producers, in addition to energy-intensive users (or aggregators) and delegates, will be required to sign the so called Award Contract, but only for the portion of energy exceeding the Contract.
Commissioning of plants following the competitive procedure
For energy-intensive users (or aggregators) who remain obliged to produce and return the quantity of energy covered by the Contract, the capacity must become operational within forty months of the signing of the Contract.
The plants relating to the 'Cluster B' bids and owned by energy-intensive users (or aggregators) or delegates, both for the portion of energy exceeding the Contract, or for third parties, must enter into operation within 36 months of the publication of the Competitive Procedure ranking and in any case no later than 31 December 2030.
Residual Advantage adjustment method
No later than the nineteenth year from the start of the repayment period, the GSE calculates the value of the Residual Advantage. If positive, one of the following solutions may be adopted:
i. immediate settlement of the amount;
ii. free transfer to the GSE of ownership of the plants and the areas on which they are located, subject to the presentation of a sworn appraisal;
iii. extension of the contractual obligations until the Residual Advantage has been fully settled for a period not exceeding a further twenty years under a further two-way CfD.
The scenario and the possible competitive context between Energy Release and Fer X
Even in the scenario outlined by the new regulatory framework, the so-called Claw Back continues to be an element of uncertainty for producers, but it cannot be ruled out that this may prejudice the interest of all producers in concluding agreements with energy-intensive customers and aggregators.
Taking into account the rules relating to the Competitive Procedure and the possibility of transferring all responsibilities relating to the entry into operation of the new capacity directly to the delegate, the conditions could be created for a frenetic phase of negotiations aimed at concluding agreements between energy-intensive customers and aggregators on the one hand and producers on the other, to allow the former to exclude any risk and the latter to secure the volume to be returned, against the release of guarantees to the GSE instead of to energy-intensive users.
It remains to be seen whether producers will also be willing to give up a useful position in the transitional FER X ranking in order to access the benefits of the new version of Energy Release assessing the conditions under which it will be possible to obtain the return of the security deposit.
Article written by Piero Viganò and Valentina Castelli.
[1] For further information, please refer to our article Discounted energy price will be offered to Energy Intensive Companies under the MASE Energy Release Decree
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