In implementation of the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 6, of Decree-Law No. 21/2026, converted with amendments by Law No. 49/2026 (the “Energy Bills Decree”), the Minister for the Environment and Energy Security (“MASE”), by Decree No. 262 of 10 August 2026 (the “Early Exit Ministerial Decree”), published on 28 September 2026 on the Ministry’s official website and in force from 29 September 2026, has set out the operational procedures relating to the so-called exit strategy from the incentive schemes for photovoltaic installations eligible for the first four editions of the “Conto Energia”, introduced by Article 2(4) of the Energy Bills Decree.
Continuing our series on the Bollette Decree and building on the points already discussed in our previous in-depth analysis on the subject , this article analyses the rules introduced by the Exit Decree, the issues that this decree leaves unresolved, and the implications of the obligation to completely refurbish the installations, with particular regard to the possibility of accessing the new support mechanisms.
1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT FOLLOWING THE OUTCOME OF APPLICATIONS FOR THE INCENTIVE SPREAD SCHEME
As is well known, Article 2 of the Bollette Decree, with a view to reducing the ASOS component of general system charges, introduced two voluntary measures aimed at operators of photovoltaic installations with a subsidised rated power exceeding 20 kW that benefit from fixed tariffs or premiums under the Conto Energia mechanism, due to expire from 1 January 2029, which are not dependent on market prices and are recognised by the GSE pursuant to the Ministerial Decrees of 28 July 2005, 19 February 2007, 6 August 2010 and 5 May 2011 (“Subsidised Installations”).
In particular, the following have been introduced: (i) the new incentive smoothing scheme (paragraphs 1–3), with a deadline for enrolment by 31 May 2026, and (ii) early exit from the incentive scheme (paragraph 4), effective from 1 January 2028, subject to an overall quota of 10 GW (“Quota”) and subject to the complete refurbishment of the plants; the definition of the procedures for implementing the exit was delegated to a decree by the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and Sustainability (MASE), which is the subject of analysis in this article. In particular, the Bollette Decree reserves direct access to early exit for plants that voluntarily opt into the new incentive spreading scheme, whilst providing for a competitive procedure should the Quota not be fully utilised. This competitive procedure, pursuant to Article 2(4)(d) of the Energy Bills Decree, also applies in the event that applications to join the new incentive spreading scheme exceed the Quota.
In this regard, the Early Exit Ministerial Decree acknowledges that applications to join the spalma-incentivi scheme submitted by 31 May 2026 do not exceed the quota. The scenario referred to in Article 2, paragraph 4, subparagraph d) of the Bollette Decree is therefore excluded. Consequently, the dual access channel already outlined in the previous analysis applies, providing for direct access for those who have joined the incentive spreading scheme and a competitive procedure, within the limits of the remaining quota, for all other parties.
2. PROCEDURES FOR ACCESS
In order to exercise the right to early exit, the parties responsible for Incentivised Plants – whether or not they have opted into the spalma-incentivi scheme – must submit an expression of interest to the GSE within thirty days of the publication of the GSE’s operational rules (the “Operational Rules”), in accordance with the procedures set out therein.
It follows that:
entities that have opted into the incentive spreading scheme pursuant to Article 2, paragraphs 1–3, of the Bollette Decree and that submit the expression of interest shall be granted direct access to the exit scheme (Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Exit Scheme Ministerial Decree);
entities that have not joined the incentive smoothing scheme but have, in any event, submitted an expression of interest shall gain access to the exit scheme through a competitive procedure (Article 2(3) of the Exit Scheme Ministerial Decree).
The Operational Rules must be published by the GSE within thirty days of the Entry into Force of the Exit Ministerial Decree. Within the following ten days, the GSE shall issue the public notice inviting expressions of interest (Article 7(3)).
3. THE COMPETITIVE PROCEDURE
The competitive procedure, launched by the GSE, will take place online by 30 June 2027, and the date on which the procedure is to be held will be set out in the Operational Rules. The main elements to be taken into account are as follows:
base value: this is determined in accordance with Article 2(4)(c)(2) of the Decreto Bollette (90 per cent of the present value of the residual cash flows from the incentives due between 1 January 2028 and the expiry of the agreement) and is made available by the GSE in accordance with the Operational Rules (Article 3(3));
quota: this is equal to 10 GW, reduced by the capacity of direct-access plants, and must in any case be at least 5 per cent lower than the total volumes for which expressions of interest have been submitted (Article 3(4));
timelines: the window for submitting applications may not exceed ten working days, and the rankings are published within the following ten working days;
bids and ranking: applications, submitted via the GSE website, must include a bid specifying a percentage reduction relative to the base value. The GSE ranks the bids in descending order according to the expected benefit to the system until the quota is filled and, where the expected benefit is equal, gives priority to the earlier date of completion of the application (Article 4, paragraphs 1, 3 and 6);
last accepted bid: if the available quota for the last accepted bid is less than the capacity for which access is requested, the plant’s full capacity is nevertheless included in the ranking (Article 4, paragraph 4).
Inclusion in a qualifying position on the ranking list constitutes, on the one hand, a commitment by the GSE to pay the award fee and, on the other, the exercise of the opt-out option by the applicant (Article 4, paragraph 5).
4. OBLIGATIONS REGARDING FULL REPLACEMENT
Applicants who opt out, whether directly or through a competitive procedure (in both cases following the submission of an expression of interest), are required (Article 2, paragraph 4) to:
carry out full refurbishment works on the Incentivised Installations from 1 January 2028 and by 31 December 2030;
ensure that the refurbishment results in an increase in power output sufficient to guarantee levels of output at least equal to: (i) 30 per cent of the expected value over the remaining incentive period, for installations with modules not located on the ground or located on the ground in agricultural areas; (ii) twice the expected value over the same period, for all other installations;
to use exclusively modules entered in the register referred to in Article 12 of Decree-Law No. 181/2023, which comply with the territorial and technical requirements set out in paragraph 1, letters b) and c) of the same provision ;
enter into fixed-term contracts, including through the mechanisms referred to in Article 28 of Legislative Decree No. 199/2021, as set out below, for the energy produced and fed into the grid attributable to the residual capacity relative to the increase in production capacity achieved through the refurbishment works.
The obligations relating to the modules and fixed-term contracts, referred to in points (c) and (d) above, must be complied with for the ten years following the commissioning of the works, “failing which the benefits received will be forfeited”.
With regard to this ten-year period, it should be noted that the Decreto Bollette, whilst making the payment of fees subject to these conditions, does not specify their duration and limits the obligation regarding modules solely to the “completion of the refurbishment works”. Under the Early Exit Ministerial Decree, however, the obligation becomes more onerous in that, for a decade from the date the project becomes operational, any replacements must also be carried out using modules entered in the relevant register, and the share of energy attributable to residual capacity must remain covered by fixed-term contracts without interruption, with a timeframe that may extend as far as 2040. Furthermore, the reference to “benefits received” suggests that forfeiture may entail the repayment of instalments already received, without any gradation based on the severity or timing of the breach.
5. VERIFICATIONS, PAYMENT OF THE SUBSIDY AND FORFEITURE
The procedure following admission comprises the following stages:
the plants must undergo a complete refurbishment with effect from 1 January 2028 and become operational by 31 December 2030; otherwise, the GSE shall declare forfeiture of the right to payments (Article 5);
notification of the project’s entry into operation must be submitted to the GSE within ninety days of the date recorded on GAUDÌ, failing which the right to the payment will be forfeited or the applicant will be removed from the ranking list (Article 6(1));
within the following ninety days, the GSE verifies that the project has become operational and that the obligations set out in Article 2(4) have been met; a negative outcome results in disqualification (Article 6(2) and (3));
in the event of a positive outcome, within the thirtieth day thereafter, the GSE shall settle payment of the remuneration with the counterparties, including within the framework of the contracts implementing the mechanisms referred to in Articles 6, 7 and 7-bis of Legislative Decree No. 199/2021 (Article 6, paragraphs 4 and 5).
The Operational Rules shall govern, amongst other things, the application forms, the date of the competitive procedure, the draft notice, the standard contracts, the documentation to be submitted with the notification of entry into operation, the obligations of beneficiaries, the administrative charges and the methods for calculating the increase in capacity (Article 7(2)). Finally, the GSE is responsible for monitoring the effects of the measure (Article 8).
6. REVAMPING AND PARTICIPATION IN THE NEW SUPPORT MECHANISMS
6.1 The dual remuneration scheme
The Early Exit Ministerial Decree confirms the approach set out in the Bollette Decree, which provides for a dual remuneration scheme for plants undergoing refurbishment: (i) for the capacity corresponding to the increase in generation capacity, the possibility of participating in the support mechanisms referred to in Articles 6, 7 and 7-bis of Legislative Decree No. 199/2021, including the FER-X (Article 2, paragraph 6); (ii) for the residual capacity, the obligation to enter into fixed-term contracts for the energy fed into the grid (Article 2(4)(d)).
On a positive note, the Ministerial Decree clarifies that access to support mechanisms for the incremental share is available to both direct-access plants and those selected through a competitive procedure, whereas the Bollette Decree literally referred only to the procedure set out in sub-paragraph (b).
6.2 A narrower scope than that provided for by law
For residual capacity, the Bollette Decree permits, as an alternative to fixed-term contracts, incentives through the mechanisms set out in Articles 6, 7 and 7-bis of Legislative Decree No. 199/2021, in accordance with European rules on state aid . The Early Exit Ministerial Decree, on the other hand, refers only to fixed-term contracts, thereby restricting the options provided for in the primary legislation. Consequently, clarification in the Operational Rules appears appropriate.
When read in conjunction with Article 6(6), the obligation to enter into contracts effectively translates into a ten-year hedging commitment, without any definition of the minimum duration of the contracts, the permitted types (physical or financial PPAs, fixed-term contracts with traders), the minimum proportion of energy to be hedged, or the procedures for verification by the GSE.
6.3 Measurement and allocation of energy
The coexistence, within the same plant, of a contract for difference on the incremental portion and a forward contract on the residual portion requires clear rules for allocating the energy produced, presumably on a proportional basis (as there are currently no plans to install metering devices for each section of the plant). It will also be necessary to define how the “power corresponding to the increase in generation capacity” is determined, based on a parameter expressed in energy: this aspect is left to the Operational Rules (Article 7, paragraph 2, letter l)) and is decisive both for participation in FER-X auctions and for the structuring of PPAs.
6.4 The instruments of the Decreto Bollette for forward contracting
For the remaining portion, operators may make use of the instruments introduced by Article 4 of the Energy Bills Decree: the notice board referred to in Article 28 of Legislative Decree No. 199/2021, with sections dedicated to contracts with a duration of not less than three years; the GSE’s guarantee of last resort, supported by SACE; and the demand aggregation service entrusted to Acquirente Unico.
It remains to be clarified whether the 15 per cent bonus provided for in Article 4, paragraphs 12 and 13, of the Energy Bills Decree applies to plants that have left the scheme, as it does for plants selected by Acquirente Unico at the end of the incentive period : the answer depends on whether early exit is treated as equivalent to the natural expiry of the incentive period and could have a significant impact on the attractiveness of the measure.
6.5 Authorisation, grid and contractual aspects
In terms of authorisation, the complete refurbishment of installations in an industrial area benefits from the “free activity” regime regardless of the resulting capacity, provided that the installation continues to fall entirely within an industrial area. However, in the absence of additional land within the same perimeter, reaching the threshold may prove technically difficult, and the standard provisions of Legislative Decree No. 190/2024 will apply, depending on the area and the scale of the project.
As regards the grid, the increase in power output will in many cases require the connection to be upgraded; and in the absence of safeguard clauses for delays not attributable to the producer, the time taken to approve connection solutions represents a potential risk factor in relation to the 31 December 2030 deadline.
Finally, as already highlighted, participation requires a comprehensive review of the plant’s contractual framework: extending surface rights and land availability agreements over a timeframe consistent with the ten-year obligations, renegotiating existing financing arrangements, and procuring modules listed in the register within a concentrated timeframe that is likely to be characterised by high demand.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Exit Ministerial Decree provides the measure with the procedural framework that was lacking but leaves the decisive elements for operators’ economic assessment to the Operational Rules: the calculation of the increase in capacity, the base value, the standard contracts, and the date of the procedure. At the same time, the measure introduces constraints not provided for in the primary legislation (the ten-year obligation, the 5 per cent “cut” to the Quota) and restricts others (the remuneration options for residual capacity), without resolving the misalignment with the deadline of 30 September 2026.
The concerns expressed in the wake of the Bollette Decree coming into force are therefore confirmed – and in some respects intensified: early exit is a complex industrial and financial operation, the benefits of which must be weighed against the loss of certain cash flows and a timeframe of commitments which, as a result of the Ministerial Decree, extends for at least ten years beyond the plant refurbishment.
Pending the Operational Rules, expected in October, interested operators could begin a technical and legal due diligence process on individual plants straight away (expected output, authorisation regime, grid and site availability, contractual and financial constraints), so as to be able to make an informed decision promptly once the implementation framework has been defined.
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